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Foreign Private Plaintiffs, Global
Conspiracies, and the Extraterritorial
Application of U.S. Antitrust Law
By WOLFGANG WURMNEST*
I. Introduction
Outside the United States, private antitrust enforcement is either
virtually non-existent or still in the fledging stages. Effective remedies for
recovering antitrust injuries are rare, even in other industrialized countries
where the task of enforcing antitrust law has often been vested in public
authorities. In developing and transition countries, even law enforcement
by public bodies is less than assured. International conspiracies profit
enormously from these enforcement gaps. Recent studies provide evidence
that global cartels have generated higher overcharges in countries without
efficient antitrust enforcement regimes than in countries with active
enforcement organs.' Moreover, global conspiracies export a significant
amount of goods into developing countries with weak enforcement systems
without fear of fines or damages claims.2 These deficiencies, in contrast to
the U.S. system of plaintiff-friendly liberal discovery procedures, treble
damages, and jury trials, make U.S. courts extremely attractive for foreign
plaintiffs.3
* Research Fellow, Max Planck Institute for Foreign Private and Private International Law,
Hamburg, Germany; Dr. iur., University of Hamburg School of Law (2002); LL.M., UC
Berkeley (2004).
1. See Julian Clarke & Simon J. Evenett, The Deterrent Effect of National Anticartel
Laws. Evidence from the International Vitamins Cartel, 47 ANTITRUST BULL. 689, 689-726
(2003).
2. See Margart Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, Contemporary International Cartels
and Developing Countries. Economic Effects and Implications for Competition Policy, 71
ANTITRUST L. J. 801,801-52 (2004).
3. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 252 (1981). In more direct language,
Lord Denning observed once that "foreign litigants are drawn to the United States as a moth
is drawn to the light." Smith Kline & French Labs Ltd. v. Bloch, 1 W.L.R. 730 (C.A. 1982).
Foreign plaintiffs win substantially more often than domestic litigants before federal courts
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In the wake of the detection of several high profile global price-fixing
cartels in the 1990s, the number of private antitrust actions brought on
behalf of foreign plaintiffs before U.S. courts skyrocketed,4 raising fears
that U.S. courts would be flooded by disputes from all over the world.5
These cases did not touch upon the question of whether U.S. courts can
hear Sherman Act claims brought by foreign plaintiffs involved in U.S.
commerce. That issue had already been answered in the affirmative in
Pfizer v. Government of India.6 In Pfizer, the Supreme Court held that
denying foreign plaintiffs injured by an antitrust violation the right to sue in
the United States would "lessen the deterrent effect of treble damages"'7 and
would not deprive violators "of the fruits of their illegality."8
This deterrence argument also played a crucial role in the latest round
of cases. Antitrust suits were brought by foreign plaintiffs against foreign
defendants participating in global price-fixing conspiracies. The plaintiffs
claimed damages for overcharges which they paid in transactions in foreign
markets. Many litigants came from countries which either had no antitrust
law or lacked efficient (private) enforcement mechanisms, i.e. from
jurisdictions where conspirators are often not held accountable for their
wrongdoing. Circuit courts were split as to whether foreign plaintiffs
injured in wholly foreign transactions should be allowed to recover under
the Sherman Act to deter cartels,9 an issue that touches upon the boundaries
of the extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust law.
The legal question raised by the recent cases centered on an
inelegantly worded' °  provision of the Foreign Trade Antitrust
because they are more selective in choosing cases to pursue to judgement. Kevin Clement
& Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American Courts, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1120, 1122-28 &
1138-41 (1996).
4. See Caribbean Broadcasting System Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC, 148 F.3d 1080
(D.C. Cir. 1998); In re Microsoft Corp., 127 F. Supp. 2d 702 (D. Md. 2001); MM Global
Servs. v. Dow Chemicals Co., 283 F. Supp. 2d 689 (D. Conn. 2003); Ferromin International
Trade Corp. v. UCAR International et. al., 153 F. Supp. 2d 700 (E.D. Pa. 2001); but see
BHP New Zealand Ltd. v. UCAR Int'l., 106 Fed. Appx. 138 (3d Cir. 2004).
5. See John Beisner, The Teeming Shore, Plaintiffs Around the Globe Use U.S. Courts
to Target Business (U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform), at
<www.legalreformnow.com/issues/GlobalForumTeeming.pdf'> (visited Aug. 5, 2004).
6. Pfizer v. Gov't of India, 434 U.S. 308, 317-19 (1978).
7. Id. at 315.
8. Id. at 314.
9. See Kruman v. Christie's International PLC, 284 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2002); Den
Norske Stats Oljeselskap AS v. HeereMac VOF, 241 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2001); Empagran v.
Hofnan-LaRoche, 315 F.3d 338 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
10. See, e.g., Richard W. Becker & Matthew H. Kirtland, Extraterritorial Application
of U.S. Antitrust Law: What Is a "Direct, Substantial, and Reasonable Foreseeable Effect"
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Improvements Act of 1982 (FTAIA), I I which for many years after its
enactment laid "mostly unnoticed in the dusty pages of the United States
Code.' 2 The FTAIA was intended to clarify the reach of U.S. antitrust law
by excluding restrictive practices directed at foreign markets from antitrust
scrutiny. According to section 6a of the FTAIA,13 the Sherman Act shall
not apply to cases where non-import trade is concerned unless (i) the
conduct has a "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" on
U.S. trade or commerce, and (ii) "such effect gives rise to a claim" under
the Sherman Act. The substantive impact on the U.S. market was apparent
in the cases which concerned worldwide conspiracies, drawing the courts'
attention to whether the FTAIA's second prong ("gives rise to a claim")
bars jurisdiction to adjudicate claims stemming from wholly foreign
transactions. 14
under the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act?, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 11, 14 (2003)
(stating that the language of the act is "clumsy"); Edward D. Cavanagh, The FTAIA and
Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Foreign Transactions under the Antitrust Laws: The New
Frontier in Antitrust Litigation, 56 S.M.U. L. Rev. 2151, 2188 (2003) (arguing that the
"FTAIA is a poorly drafted, needlessly complicated and woefully inadequate statute").
11. See id.
12. Makan Delrahim, Perspectives on International Antitrust Enforcement: Recent
Legal Developments and Policy Implications, Address at the American Bar Association,
Section of Antitrust Law (Sept. 18, 2003), at
<www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/201509.htm#N4> (visited Oct. 6, 2004) (observing:
"For many years after the FTAIA was enacted in 1982, it lay mostly unnoticed in dusty
pages of the United States Code; few lawsuits invoked it, and almost none were
successful").
13. 15 U.S.C.A. § 6a (2004). The statute provides as follows:
Sections 1 to 7 of this title shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce
(other than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations unless
(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect
(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign nations, or
on import trade or import commerce with foreign nations; or
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of a person engaged
in such trade or commerce in the United States; and
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of sections 1 to 7 of [the
Sherman Act], other than this section.
[Proviso:] If sections 1 to 7 of this title apply to such conduct only because of the
operation of paragraph (1)(B), then sections 1 to 7 of this title shall apply to such
conduct only for injury to export business in the United States.
14. For a discussion of the cases, see Salil K. Mehra, "A" Is For Anachronism: The
FTAIA Meets the World Trading System, 107 DICK. L. REV. 763 (2003); Kareen O'Brien,
Giving Rise to a Claim: Is FTAIA 's Section 6a(2) an Antitrust Plaintif's Key to the
Courthouse Door?, 9 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 421 (2002-03); PHILLIP E. AREEDA &
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 273c (Suppl. 2003); Deborah J. Buswell, Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act: A Three Ring Circus - Three Circuits, Three
Interpretations, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 979 (2003); Ryan A. Haas, Act Locally, Apply
Globally: Protecting Consumers From International Cartels By Applying Domestic
20051
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari in F. Hoffinann-LaRoche Ltd. v.
Empagran S.A. (Empagran)15 to clarify the meaning of the FTAIA's
second prong. Empagran concerned a class action brought by foreign
plaintiffs against foreign firms that participated in the worldwide vitamins
cartel. This cartel consisted of a series of price-fixing conspiracies
concerning vitamin products and was described as the most pervasive and
harmful antitrust conspiracy ever uncovered.16 The plaintiffs alleged that
the defendant's price-fixing conspiracy raised the price of vitamin products
for customers in the United States and in foreign countries. They claimed
damages for injuries stemming from overcharges that occurred in
transactions taking place in Australia, Ecuador, Ukraine, and Panama.1
7
The debate on the jurisdictional reach of U.S. antitrust law was closely
monitored by many trading partners of the United States. Seven foreign
governments,' 8 most of them representing countries in which cartel
Antitrust Law Globally, 15 LoY. CONSUMER L. REv. 99 (2003).
15. F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 124 S.Ct. 2359 (2004). See generally
Spencer Webber Waller, et al., The Future of Private Right of Action in Antitrust, 16 Loy.
CONSUMER L. REv. 295-430 (2004); Joshua P. Davis, Supreme Court Review of the Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act: Case of A Misleading Question?, 38 U.S.F. L. Rev. 431
(2004); Andrew Stanger, Analyzing U.S. Antitrust Jurisdiction over Foreign Parties After
Empagran S.A. v. Hoffinan-LaRoche, Ltd., 2003 BYU L. REv. 1453 (2003).
16. See David Barboza, $1.1 Billion to Settle Suit in Vitamins, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4,
1999, quoting Joel I. Klein, head of the United States Department of Justice, Antitrust
Division. The European Commission described the vitamin cartels as "the most damaging
series of cartels the Commission has ever investigated." See Press Release, European
Commission, Commission Imposes Fines on Vitamin Cartels, IP/01/1625, Nov. 21, 2001,
available at <http://europa.eu.int/rapid/>. Consequently, the fines imposed by the
Department of Justice and the European Commission on cartel members reached record
marks. Hoffmann-La Roche and BASF paid criminal fines of $500 million and $225
million, respectively, to resolve the U.S. Department of Justice's claims. Plea Agreement at
5, Hoffmann-La Roche (No. 99-CR- 184-R), available at
<www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f2400/hoffman.pdf>; and Plea Agreement at 5, BASF, (No. 99-
CR-200-R), available at <www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f2400/basf.pdf>. The European
Commission collected fines of 855.2 million euros from cartel participants, including 462
million euros from Hoffmann-La Roche and 296 million euros from BASF. See
Commission Decision of Nov. 21, 2001, Case COMP/E-1/37.512 - Vitamins, 2003 O.J.
(L6/1).
17. Empagran, 124 S. Ct. at 2364. Later, one of the Australian plaintiffs (Windridge
Pig Farm) dropped out of the suit to become a member of a class action initiated before
Australian courts. Oral Argument at 7 (Shapiro) & 30 (Goldstein), Empagram, (No. 3-724),
available at 2004 WL 1047902.
18. See Brief for the Government of Canada as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal of
Feb. 3, 2004, Empagran, available at 2004 WL 226389; Brief of the Government of Japan
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners of Feb. 3, 2004, Empagran, available at 2004
WL 226390; Brief of the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and Belgium as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners of Feb. 3, 2004, Empagran, available at 2004 WL
226388; Brief of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the
[Vol. 28:2
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members were incorporated and none representing the plaintiffs' home
countries, intervened in Empagran as amici curiae. They urged the Court
not to allow such claims, arguing that the application of U.S. antitrust law
to remedy injuries sustained in foreign markets would undermine the
principle of comity since it would interfere with their sovereign right to
regulate their own economies. 19 The Supreme Court ruled that U.S.
antitrust law cannot be applied to remedy injuries stemming from wholly
foreign transactions, provided that the adverse foreign effects were
independent of any anticompetitive effects felt on the U.S. market.20
However, the case was remanded for further proceedings since the lower
court had not addressed the question of whether domestic effects were
present.2 '
This article analyzes the impact of the Empagran decision with
particular attention to acknowledged antitrust law enforcement gaps in the
international arena. Part II provides a brief overview of the problems and
pitfalls of an extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law. Part III
highlights the core findings of the Empagran decision in more detail. It is
argued that the Court was right in rejecting the claims of foreign purchasers
even though antitrust law enforcement deficiencies in many parts of the
world do not permit foreign plaintiffs to recover their antitrust injuries.
Finally, Part V addresses the question of whether the Department of
Justice could take international enforcement gaps into consideration when
assessing the fines for cartel participants.
Kingdom of the Netherlands as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners of Feb. 3, 2004,
Empagran, available at 2004 WL 226597. The United States government also
intervened on the side of the petitioners. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners of Feb. 3, 2004, Empagran, available at 2004 WL 234125.
19. E.g., Brief of the Government of Japan, supra note 18, at *2.
20. Empagran, 124 S. Ct. at 2366.
21. Id. at 2372. On remand the D.C. Circuit ruled that the plaintiffs adequately
preserved their antitrust claims and instructed the parties to submit full merit briefs on
whether the nature of the alleged link between the foreign injury and the domestic effects is
legally sufficient to trigger application of the FTAIA's domestic-injury exception.
Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., 388 F.3d 337 (D.C.Cir. 2004).
2005]
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II. Extraterritoriality of U.S. Antitrust Law: Problems and
Pitfalls
A. The Effects Doctrine and Its Perception Abroad
Since Judge Learned Hand's ruling in United States v. Alcoa,2 2 which
was cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Hartford Fire Insurance
Co. v. California,2 3 the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law has
been based on the "effects test": U.S. antitrust law applies to cases when
"the activities of the defendant had an impact within the United States and
upon its foreign trade. 24 The effects doctrine has caused severe friction25
with foreign sovereigns who used to cling to a more territorial approach.26
Over the years, however, the international hostility against the effects test
has subsided. Today, application of antitrust law against conduct
substantially affecting a given market is widely accepted in the
international arena. It is common sense that in global commerce, a strict
territoriality principle cannot adequately protect competition. It does not
capture anticompetitive conduct occurring entirely abroad that affects a
domestic market. Therefore, many states have adopted the effects
22. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945). This
case silently buried the strict territorial approach taken by Justice Holmes in American
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., according to which the Sherman Act applies only to
anticompetitive conduct that occurred on U.S. soil, see Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,
213 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1909).
23. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cal., 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993) (Justice Souter emphasized
that "it is well established by now that the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was
meant to produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United States"). A
thorough analysis of conflict-of-law theories and the extraterritorial application of antitrust
law is provided by William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An
Argument for Judicial Unilateralism, 39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 101 (1998).
24. E.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide, 370 U.S. 690, 705 (1962).
25. The vigorous opposition of foreign states to the extraterritorial application of U.S.
antitrust law some decades ago is still remembered. Many states, such as Australia, France,
the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and New Zealand, reacted to the broad application of
U.S. antitrust laws, especially with respect to courts' orders to produce documents in a
considerable amount of states, by enacting blocking legislation. See OECD, COMPETITION
LAW ENFORCEMENT: INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN THE COLLECTION OF INFORMATION
44-50 (1984).
26. The United Kingdom was particularly hostile toward the effects test. See Note no.
196 of the British Embassy at Washington, D.C., presented to the United States Department
of State on July 27, 1978, 49 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L. L. 390, 391 (1978) (stating: "HM
Government consider that in the present state of international law there is no basis for




principle, among them member states of the European Community, 27 New
Zealand,2 8 and some Latin American countries.29  The European
Community (E.C.) has adopted an approach similar to the effects test. The
European Court of Justice (E.C.J.) held in the Wood Pulp case that conduct
carried out by a foreign corporation outside the E.C. may still be subject to
E.C. antitrust law if the restrictions of competition are to be implemented
within the common market (so-called "implementation theory").
30
Furthermore, the E.C.J. assumes that there is a sufficient territorial
connection between an acting company established and incorporated in a
non-member state and the E.C. if a subsidiary of that company, although
having a distinct legal personality, is established in the E.C.31 The Court of
First Instance (C.F.I.) went one more step toward the embracement of the
pure effects test by holding in the Gencor-merger case that the European
Commission has jurisdiction where activities, though carried out outside
the E.C., "have the substantial effect of creating or strengthening a
dominant position as a result of which effective competition or a substantial
part thereof will be significantly impeded., 32 Even the United Kingdom,
27. Among the first was Germany; see GESETZ GEGEN WETrBEWERBSBESCHRANKUNGEN
[GWB] [ANTITRUST ACT] sec. 130(2) (F.R.G.), unofficial translation into English available
at <www.bundeskartellamt.de/wEnglisch/CompetitionAct/CompAct.shtml?navid=9>
(visited March 25, 2005). Moreover, one can now name, inter alia, Austria, Greece, France,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Poland. See Ivo E. Schwartz & Jurgen Basedow,
Restrictions on Competition, in 111-35 INT'L. ENCYCL. COMP. L. 1, 134-39 (1995); and
Jtirgen Basedow & Stefan L. Pankoke, General Report, in LIMITS AND CONTROL OF
COMPETITION WITH A VIEW TO INTERNATIONAL HARMONIZATION (SECTION III.A.2 OF THE
XVITH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW) 27-29 (Jurgen Basedow ed.,
2002).
28. Andrew Matthews, New Zealand, in LIMITS AND CONTROL OF COMPETITION WITH A
VIEW TO INTERNATIONAL HARMONIZATION (SECTION III.A.2 OF THE XVITH INTERNATIONAL
CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW) 324-25 (Jurgen Basedow ed., 2002).
29. See JORGEN BASEDOW, WELTKARTELLRECHT. AUSGANGSLAGE UND ZIELE,
METHODEN UND GRENZEN DER INTERNATIONALEN VEREINHEITLICHUNG DES RECHTS DER
WETTBEWERBSBESCHRANKUNGEN 2 (1998).
30. Joined cases 89, 104, 114, 116, 117 & 125 to 129/85, A. Ahlstrom Osakeyhtio v.
Commission, 1988 E.C.R. 5193, 5243 ("Wood Pulp Case"). Although minor differences
remain between the effects test and the implementation theory, commentators have labeled
this approach "pseudo-territoriality" or the "effects principle in disguise." See the
references given by Jirgen Basedow, International Antitrust: From Extraterritorial
Application to Harmonization, 60 LA. L. REv. 1037, 1040 (2000). Some commentators
argue, however, that the E.C.J. did not depart from the territoriality principle. See Vaughan
Lowe, International Law and the Effects Doctrine in the European Court of Justice, 48
CAMBRIDGE L. J. 9, 11 (1989); Dieter G.F. Lange & John Byron Sandage, The Wood Pulp
Decision and Its Implications for the Scope of EC Competition Law, 26 COMMON MARKET
L. REV. 137, 160-64 (1989).
31. Case 48/69, Imperial Chem. Indus. v. Commission, 1972 E.C.R. 619, 662.
32. Case T-102/96, Gencor v. Commission, 1999 E.C.R. 11-753, 785: "[a]pplication of
2005]
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one of the most ardent opponents of the pure effects principle, recently
adapted its competition law to the implementation theory.33
B. Modern Regulatory Conflicts
Although one can witness a general convergence in certain core areas
of antitrust law,34 in many areas of substantive law remarkable divergences
remain between different legal orders. 35 Thus, the effects test inevitably
leads to interference with policy choices of foreign nations. With regard to
enforcement through antitrust authorities, tensions have lessened
considerably through the adoption of international antitrust enforcement
cooperation agreements. These agreements oblige enforcement authorities
to consider the interests of foreign nations in international cases and require
them to evaluate whether enforcement should be left to the authorities of a
36foreign state.
[the E.C. merger Regulation] is justified under public international law when it is
foreseeable that a proposed concentration will have an immediate and substantial effect in
the Community." It must be noted, however, that the C.F.I. did not rule against the
implementation doctrine set forth by the E.C.J. in Wood Pulp because the foreign merging
companies carried out business within the E.C. The Gencor court emphasized:
According to Wood Pulp, the criterion as to the implementation of an agreement is
satisfied by mere sale within the Community, irrespective of the location of the
sources of supply and the production plant. It is not disputed that Gencor and
Lonrho carried out sales in the Community before the concentration and would
have continued to do so thereafter.
Id. at 784.
33. See Competition Act sec. 2(3) (1998) (U.K.), available at
<www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/80041--a.htm#2> (visited March 25, 2005) (stating that
the act "applies only if the agreement, decision or practice is, or is intended to be,
implemented in the United Kingdom").
34. Many states are opposed to horizontal price fixing, geographical and other market
sharing agreements, bid rigging, and resale price maintenance. See Basedow & Pankoke,
supra note 27, at 3-9 and 30-35. This study takes into account the antitrust laws of
Argentina, Australia, Denmark, the European Community, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
MERCOSUR, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Spain, Switzerland, and the United
States.
35. One example is the assessment of vertical restraints. See id. at 36-39.
36. See, e.g., Agreement between the United States government and the European
Community regarding the application of their competition laws, art. VI, 1995 O.J. (L 95) 45.
It confers the duty upon national authorities to take into account the important interests of
the other party at all stages of enforcement activities. See also Antitrust Enforcement
Guidelines for International Operations, sec. 3.2 (Dept. of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission, April 1995), available at <www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/internat.htm>
(visited March 25, 2005) ("In enforcing the antitrust laws, the Agencies consider
international comity .... Thus, in determining whether to assert jurisdiction to investigate
or bring an action, or to seek particular remedies in a given case, each Agency takes into
account whether significant interests of any foreign sovereign would be affected").
[Vol. 28:2
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But these bilateral agreements do not affect private antitrust litigation.
Since private litigants, not bound by prior enforcement policy or political
constraints, may tread where the government would not,37 they constantly
test the limits of the extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust law in an attempt
to benefit from the attractive availability of treble damages. Outside the
United States private enforcement of antitrust law is often non-existent,
38
highly disputed,39 or underdeveloped. This holds even true for the
industrialized world; e.g., Japan40 and the E.C. 4 1 have not yet developed
efficient private antitrust enforcement schemes, although one must concede
that private antitrust litigation before European courts has slowly begun to
37. SPENCER WEBBER WALLACE, ANTITRUST & AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD § 13:19
(citing International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. Elec. Corp., 351 F. Supp. 1153, 1184-
85 [D. Haw. 1972]).
38. See Commerce and Contestability, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 3, 1998, at 16-17 (pointing
out that around 60 WTO members still have no antitrust laws).
39. See, e.g., Wouter P.J. Wils, Should Private Antitrust Enforcement Be Encouraged in
Europe?, 26 WORLD COMPETITION 473, 488 (2003):
[P]rivate actions for damages or injunctive relief are rare [in Europe]. [This]
situation is a desirable one. Indeed, from the perspective of ensuring that the
antitrust prohibitions are not violated, public antitrust enforcement is inherently
superior to private enforcement .... There is not even a case for a supplementary
role for private enforcement, as the adequate level of sanctions and the adequate
number and variety of prosecutions can be endured more effectively and at lower
cost through public enforcement.
40. See, e.g., J. Mark Ramseyer, The Costs of the Consensual Myth: Antitrust
Enforcement and Institutional Barriers to Litigation in Japan, 94 YALE L.J. 604, 643 (1985)
(concluding "institutional barriers to litigation in Japan have, it appears, all but eliminated
private antitrust damage suits); Harry First, Antitrust Enforcement in Japan, 64 ANTITRUST
L.J. 137, 182 (1995) (stating that private actions remain "undeveloped, with no reported
case of an affirmed antitrust damages award in the [Japanese Antimonopoly] Act's
history."); James D. Fry, Struggling to Teethe: Japan's Antitrust Enforcement Regime, 32
LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 825, 852-53 (2001) (emphasizing that "private damage actions
brought under the [Antimonopoly Act] have shown to be weak.... Although the [Act]
provides for such claims, practically none of Japan's antitrust suits have been brought in the
form of private actions; when they are brought, the claimant never prevails.").
41. Over the last four decades only very few damages actions against violations of E.C.
antitrust law were brought before European courts. See Jargen Basedow, Who Will Protect
Competition in Europe? From Central Enforcement to Authority Networks and Private
Litigation, 2 EUR. Bus. ORG. L. REv. [EBOR] 443, 461 (2001); Donncadh Woods et al.,
Private Enforcement of Community Competition Law: Modernisation and the Road Ahead,
2/2004 COMPETITION POL'Y NEWSL. 31, 32. A recent study commissioned by the European
Commission counted only twelve successful damages awards for violation of E.C. antitrust
law since 1962. This study also highlights that the number of damages awards for breach of
national antitrust law was similarly low. See Study on the conditions of claims for damages
in case of infringement of EC competition rules (2004), available at
<europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/others/private enforcement/index en.html>
(visited March 25, 2005).
2005]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
increase.42  Above all, foreign states regularly limit the civil liability of
those engaging in anticompetitive conduct to compensatory damages thus
depriving consumers from recovering punitive or treble damages.43
These differences in private action remedies are the key factor in
conflicts arising from the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law.4
In the past, foreign states have enacted "blocking" or "claw back" statutes
in response to the extraterritorial enforcement of U.S. antitrust law in the
post-Alcoa world.45 The old treble damages dispute got a new twist with
the widespread adoption of leniency programs. These programs seek to
balance the interests of disclosure, deterrence, and punishment by
rewarding the "whistle blower. '46 The first company to provide decisive
42. In the aftermath of the vitamins cartel the English High Court ruled that English
courts have jurisdiction for private damage actions for violation of E.C. antitrust law.
Provimi Ltd. v. Aventis Animal Nutrition SA and Other Actions, [2003] EWHC 961
(Comm.); see F. Wenzel Bulst, The Provimi Decision of the High Court: Beginnings of
Private Antitrust Litigation in Europe, 4 EBOR 623 (2003); Mark Furse, Provimi v. Aventis:
Damages and Jurisdiction, 2003 J. COMP. LAW 119. In Germany, a Swiss member of the
vitamins cartel was held liable for damages for breach of E.C. antitrust law. See
Landgericht Dortmund, 2004 Europ~iisches Wirtschafts- und Steuerrecht [EWS] 434 (F.R.G.
2004); and the case note by F. Wenzel Bulst, Internationale Zustidndigkeit, anwendbares
Recht und Schadensberechnung im Kartelldeliktsrecht, 2004 EWS 403 (F.R.G. 2004). Also
Italian courts recently have awarded damages in favour of victims of an insurance cartel.
See Giudice di Pace di Casoria, I1 Foro Italiano [Foro It.], 2003, I, 2192. See also Corte di
cassazione, Foro. It. 2003, I, 1121 and the case notes by Enrico Scoditti, Il consumatore e
l'antitrust, Foro It. 2003, I, 1127 and Giorgio Afferni & F. Wenzel Bulst, Kartellrechtliche
Schadensersatzanspriche von Verbrauchern, Zeitschrift ffr Europdisches Privatrecht
[ZEuP] 2005, 143.
43. For example, European states limit damages for infringement of antitrust law to
compensatory damages. Even in countries such as England that generally allow for
exemplary damages in certain contexts, courts have not awarded punitive damages in
antitrust cases. See, e.g., Crehan v. Inntrepreneur Pub Co. [2004] EWCA Civ 637 (C.A.).
44. See SPENCER W. WALLER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD § 15:6 at
15-12; Joseph P. Griffin, Jurisdiction and Enforcement: Foreign Governmental Reactions to
U.S. Assertions of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 6 GEO. MASON L. REv. 505, 516 (1998);
Hannah L. Buxbaum, The Private Attorney General in a Global Age: Public Interests in
Private International Antitrust Litigation, 26 YALE J. INT'L. L. 219, 251 (2001); Clifford A.
Jones, Exporting Antitrust Courtrooms to the World: Private Enforcement in a Global
Market, 16 Loy. CONSUMERL. REv. 409, 419 (2004).
45. Whereas "blocking statutes" prohibit national authorities from co-operating in
extraterritorial pre-trial discovery proceedings and from enforcing treble damages awards,
"claw-back statutes" give defendants in U.S. antitrust actions a cause of action to "claw
back" from the (former) plaintiff any excess over actual damages paid in a treble damages
judgment. For examples of statutes and laws in various countries in response to U.S. treble
damages awards, see A.V. LOWE, EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION 79-225 (1983).
46. The OECD jurisdictions that have adopted leniency programs include Australia,
France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, South Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the European Union, and the United States. See OECD,
POLICY BRIEF: USING LENIENCY TO FIGHT HARD CORE CARTELS 2 (2001), available at
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information about a cartel and cooperate fully with the authorities receives
amnesty from fines and criminal prosecution.47 These amnesty programs
have proven to be very effective in the fight against hard-core cartels. 48 It
was argued that their success would be impaired if plaintiffs injured in
foreign transactions could sue before U.S. courts, because potential
leniency applicants would weigh the benefits (amnesty) against the costs
(civil liability) before leaving a cartel. The risk of paying treble damages,
not only for U.S. transactions but also for those occurring entirely outside
the United States, would be an overwhelming disincentive to cooperate
with antitrust authorities.49 Yet it must be noted that conflicts stemming
from treble damage remedies could be substantially lessened in the near
future, at least with regard to Europe. The E.C. plans to revise its
enforcement system in the near future. Some voices favor the introduction
of "double damages" to remedy antitrust law infringements,5 ° and this
<www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/8/21554908.pdf> (visited March 25, 2005). For a comparison
of the most important programs, see Jason D. Medinger, Antitrust Leniency Programs: A
Call for Increased Harmonization as Proliferating Programs Undermine Deterrence, 52
EMORY L. J. 1439 (2003).
47. See OECD, FIGHTING HARD-CORE CARTELS: HARM, EFFECTIVE SANCTIONS AND
LENIENCY PROGRAMMES 7-32 (2002), available at
<www.oecd.org/dataoecd/41/44/1841189l.pdf> (visited March 25, 2005).
48. See R. Hewitt Pate (Acting Assistant Attorney General), Anti-Cartel Enforcement:
The Core Antitrust Mission, Address before the British Institute of International and
Comparative Law at the Third Annual Conference on International and Comparative
Competition Law (May 16, 2003), available at
<www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/201199.htm> (visited March 25, 2005) ("[the] rate of
amnesty applications [in the U.S.] is at an all time high - in the first six months in this fiscal
year, we have averaged three applications per month"). For the E.C., see Bertus van
Barlingen, A View from the Inside: The European Commission's 2002 Leniency Notice After
One Year of Operation, 17-SPG Antitrust 84 ("[i]n the first year [after the new leniency
program came into force] more than twenty applications for immunity were received in
separate cases. For cartels, this is a huge number. By comparison, during the six years of
operation of the 1996 Notice, leniency was requested in a total of sixteen separate cases").
For reform proposals, see Donal Mc Elwee, Should the European Commission Adopt
"Amnesty Plus " in Its Fight Against Hard-Core Cartels?, 2004 EuR. COMPETITION L. REV.
558.
49. See, e.g., Brief for the Government of Canada at 11-16, Empagran, supra note 18;
Brief for the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and Belgium at 29-30,
Empagran, supra note 18; Brief for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and the Kingdom of the Netherlands at 9-13, Empagran, supra note 18; Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae at 6, Empagran, supra note 18.
50. See MONOPOLKOMMISSION, DAS ALLGEMEINE WETTBEWERBSRECHT IN DER
SIEBENTEN GWB-NOVELLE [GENERAL COMPETITION LAW IN THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT TO
THE ANTITRUST ACT] 40, 67 (2004) (recommending the introduction of double damages as a
remedy under German law for breaches of E.C. antitrust law). See also Basedow, supra
note 41, at 466 (arguing that "if the Commission want to use private initiatives for enforcing
competition laws in the public interest, it should consider the U.S. model of a private
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would bring U.S. and E.C. antitrust law further into line. A recent
amendment of U.S. law missed its chance to further reduce tensions:
Congress adopted the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform
Act, limiting antitrust damages awards to compensatory damages for
defendants who have participated in U.S. leniency programs. 51 However,
defendants who have participated in foreign leniency programs do not
benefit from this "de-trebling. 52
It is noteworthy that the observations above on regulatory conflicts
primarily concern industrialized countries that have robust antitrust laws.
Outside the industrialized world, effective antitrust enforcement is not
assured despite the widespread enactment of such laws.53 A recent OECD
study states bluntly that although "sanctions have increased significantly in
some countries in recent years, they are, on the whole, still inadequate. 54
Two key problems can be named: smaller states' inability to enforce their
antitrust laws abroad and inefficiencies resulting from their national legal
framework. Developing countries in particular lack credible deterrence
power to control the anticompetitive acts of multinational corporations.55
Whereas the industrialized countries zealously argue for a very limited
reach of U.S. antitrust law, none of the countries with a weak antitrust
enforcement system has openly voiced these concerns.
III. Global Cartels and the Reach of U.S. Antitrust Law
In Empagran, the U.S. Supreme Court denied foreign plaintiffs the
ability to recover damages sustained in foreign transactions when their
harm occurred independently from effects on the U.S. market. The Court
warned that to open the courthouses for such claims would confer
attorney general who is spurred to enforce the law by expectation of treble damages").
51. Cf Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 108-237,
§ 213(a), 118 Stat. 666 (2004).
52. Ralf Michaels & Daniel Zimmer, U.S. Gerichte als Weltkartellgerichte?, 2004
PRAXIS DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT- UND VERFAHRENSRECHTS [IPRAx] 451, 457.
53. See Eleanor M. Fox, International Antitrust and the Doha Dome, 43 VA. J. INT'L L.
911, 916 (2003) (stating that many developing countries, though they have antitrust laws, do
not give them "serious regard by their polity, or they simply do not have the resources to
enforce the law"). Many states in transition openly admit severe enforcement deficits. See
Fourth OECD Global Forum on Competition held in Paris in February 2004, National
Reports for Session 11: Challenges/Obstacles Faced by Competition Authorities in Achieving
Greater Economic Development through the Promotion of Competition, available at
<http://www.oecd.org> (visited March 25, 2005).
54. OECD, HARD CORE CARTELS: RECENT PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES AHEAD 3
(2003), available at <wwwl.oecd.org/publications/e-book/2403011E.pdf> (visited March
25, 2005).
55. Fox, supra note 53, at 916.
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worldwide jurisdiction "to any foreign suitor wishing to sue its own local
supplier, but unhappy with its own sovereign's provisions for private
antitrust enforcement., 56 However, the above-demonstrated division of the
world into countries which enforce their antitrust laws and countries
without such laws or without efficient enforcement mechanisms leads to
the question of whether U.S. courts should adopt a flexible solution to mark
the limits of the extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust law. It was argued
that foreign plaintiffs injured in foreign markets without effective antitrust
enforcement schemes should be entitled to bring Sherman Act claims,
while claims for injuries stemming from markets with strong enforcement
mechanisms should be barred.57 Such an approach would ensure that the
conspirators would also be held accountable for their wrongdoings in
markets where efficient antitrust enforcement is not assured. But it is
doubtful whether assessing the limits of the extraterritorial reach of U.S.
antitrust law in such a manner would be the right task for a court.
A. The Limits of the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Antitrust Law
The discussion of "flexible solutions" revives the old debate of
appropriate boundaries of the reach of U.S. antitrust law. When
pronouncing upon the effects test, Judge Learned Hand already observed
that U.S. courts shall respect "the limitations customarily observed by
nations upon the exercise of their powers" 58 and emphasized that U.S.
antitrust laws shall not be used to "punish all whom [U.S.] courts can
catch., 59  In later decisions, a jurisdictional rule of reason credited to
Kingman Brewster60 emerged to limit the extraterritorial reach of antitrust
laws. Relying on international customary law,61 some courts have engaged
in interest balancing to evaluate whether international cases should be
adjudicated before U.S. courts.62 This approach was strengthened by the
56. Empagran, 124 S. Ct. at 2367 (citing AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, 273,
51-52 [Suppl. 2003]).
57. See Empagran Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors Ralf Michaels, Hannah
Buxbaum, and Horatia Muir Watt in Support of Respondents, 2004 WL 542780, at *22
58. Aluminium Co. ofAm., 148 F.2d at 443.
59. Id.
60. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976)
(citing KINGMAN BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 446 (1958)).
61. See Karl M. Meessen, Antitrust Jurisdiction Under Customary International Law,
78 AM. J. INT'L L. 783, 785-86 (1984).
62. See, e.g., Timberlane Lumber, 549 F.2d at 611-12; Mannington Mills, Inc. v.
Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297-98 (3d Cir. 1979); Industrial Investment
Development Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 884-85 (5th Cir. 1982); Montreal
Trading Ltd. v. Amax, Inc., 661 F.2d 864, 869-70 (10th Cir. 1981). Cf Metallgesellschaft
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adoption of the American Restatement of Foreign Relations Law (Third).6 3
According to section 403 of this restatement, courts shall balance various
domestic and foreign interests of both public and private natures to
determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is
reasonable. 64 But this comity-based approach to limiting the reach of U.S.
antitrust laws had never been undisputed. Some circuit courts rejected it
bluntly 65 and scholars also voiced concerns about the soundness of interest
balancing in private cases by pointing out that a sovereign's interest in
enforcing its regulatory rules is of a different order than the "interest,"
meaning social policy, underlying the rules of torts and contracts. 66 It is
further argued that the balancing approach is not the most economically
efficient approach to extraterritorial antitrust regulation as it may lead to
underregulation.6 7
The Supreme Court's criticized 68 decision in Hartford Fire Insurance
Co. v. California69 was widely regarded as a near death blow to comity.
70
AG v. Sumitomo Corp. of America, 325 F.3d 836, 842 (7th Cir.2003) ("In this case,
however, we have no need to come to some ultimate conclusion about where U.S. interests
end and those of other countries take over.").
63. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (1987). See generally Eleanor
M. Fox, Extraterritoriality, Antitrust, and the New Restatement: Is "Reasonableness" the
Answer?, 19 N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L. & POL. 565, 584-85 (1987).
64. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403(2) (1987).
65. See, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 948-49 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
("These [Timberlane] types of factors are not useful in resolving the controversy."); In re
Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 1255 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding a "failure to
consider Timberlane test did not constitute an abuse of discretion").
66. See Russell J. Weintraub, The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust and
Securities Laws: An Inquiry Into the Utility of a "Choice-of-Law" Approach, 70 TEX. L.
REv. 1799, 1818 (1992); Larry Kramer, Extraterritorial Application of American Law After
the Insurance Antitrust Case: A Reply to Professors Lowenfeld and Trimble, 89 AM. J.
INT'L. L. 750, 755 (1995) (arguing that case-by-case balancing is a bad idea).
67. See William S. Dodge, An Economic Defense of Concurrent Antitrust Jurisdiction,
38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 27, 33-40 (2003); Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations,
90 GEO. L.J. 883, 926-27 (2002) (emphasizing that the "objective of achieving a globally
efficient choice-of-law regime is best served through application of the presumption against
extraterritoriality" and that a case-by-case determination by courts comes "with significant
costs").
68. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Conflict, Balancing of Interests, and the Exercise of
Jurisdiction to Prescribe: Reflections on the Insurance Antitrust Case, 89 AM. J. INT'L L.
42, 45-47 (1995); Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust as Extraterritorial Regulatory Policy, 48
ANTITRUST BULL. 629, 643 (2003) ("After half of a century of debate over the meaning of
comity in international Sherman Act adjudication, the Supreme Court gave the doctrine an
extraordinarily narrow meaning in the Hartford Fire case.").
69. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cal., 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
70. See Spencer Weber Waller, The Twilight of Comity, 38 COLUMB. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
563, 564 (2000); Buxbaum, supra note 44, at 234 ("In Hartford Fire, the U.S. Supreme
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In Hartford, the plaintiffs alleged that a group of U.S.- and U.K.-based re-
insurers and their brokers had violated section 1 of the Sherman Act by
agreeing among themselves not to reinsure any general liability insurer that
sold insurance policies not complying with the policies the defendant
insurers wanted to sell. The British defending companies moved to
dismiss, citing the principle of international comity and arguing that U.S.
antitrust law could not be applied to their agreement made and executed
entirely in the United Kingdom and legal under the laws thereof. Justice
Souter, delivering the judgment for the majority of the Court, rejected these
arguments. Relying on the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law (Third),
he held that the Court did not need to decide whether a court may decline to
exercise Sherman Act jurisdiction over foreign conduct, because, even
assuming that a court may do so, there must be a "true conflict between
domestic and foreign [antitrust] law., 71 The court concluded that no such
conflict existed because British law did not require the defendants to act in
a matter prohibited by U.S. law. 7 In dissent, Justice Scalia, writing also
for three other justices, argued that the majority had "completely
misinterpreted" 73 the provisions of the restatement and emphasized that the
Court should refrain from exercising jurisdiction in order to avoid
unnecessary conflicts with its closest trading partners.74
In Empagran,75 the Supreme Court re-animated the reasonable
standard as a yardstick to measure the reach of U.S. antitrust law. Justice
Breyer, writing for the Court, observed with reference to section 403 of the
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law (Third) that the Supreme Court
ordinarily construes ambiguous statutes, in the case at hand section 6a of
the FTAIA, in accordance with international law to avoid "unreasonable
interference with other nations' sovereign authority. '76 He stressed that
"this rule helps the potentially conflicting laws of different nations work
together in harmony. A harmony that is particularly needed in today's
highly interdependent commercial world., 77  And he emphasized that
Court essentially eliminated the use of judicial interest balancing in extraterritorial antitrust
cases.").
71. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 798 (quoting Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale
v. U. S. Dist. Ct. for S.D. Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 555 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
72. Id. at 799.
73. Id. at821.
74. Id. at 820.
75. Empagran, 124 S.Ct. at 2361.
76. Id. at 2366.
77. Id.
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Congress would not have tried to impose U.S. antitrust laws "in an act of
legal imperialism, through legislative fiat" onto foreign nations.78 But the
rule of non-interference with foreign interests is not absolute. Courts may
apply U.S. antitrust law when it is "reasonable, and hence consistent with
prescriptive comity principles" to do SO. 7 9 This finding certainly signals a
renewed interest on the part of the Supreme Court in using principles of
comity to confine the extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust law.8° It seems
the Court silently wanted to correct the majority's stand in the Hartford
Fire case.8' The reasoning in Empagran comes close to the dissent in
Hartford Fire. The Court not only recognized that there are "dramatic"
differences of opinion in the world about appropriate remedies,82 but also
noted that foreign citizens would be permitted to bypass less generous
remedial schemes if they could recover antitrust injuries sustained in
foreign transactions before U.S. courts.83 Further, the general anti-
hegemonic statement that Congress did not intend to impose U.S. antitrust
laws "in an act of legal imperialism, through legislative fiat" makes clear
that the Supreme Court is fully aware of the need for sound limitation
criteria to confine the international reach of U.S. antitrust law.
84
B. Balancing Foreign Regulatory Policy?
Although the Supreme Court firmly established comity considerations
to determine the reach of U.S. antitrust law in Empagran, it declined to
delve into a classical interest analysis by balancing different connecting
factors. The foreign plaintiffs85 supported by the amici curiae law
professors Michaels, Buxbaum, and Muir Watt 86 had argued for adopting a
78. Id. at 2369.
79. Id.
80. See Hannah L. Buxbaum, National Courts, Global Cartels: F. Hoffman-LaRoche
Ltd. v. Empagran S.A. (U.S. Supreme Court 2004), 5 GERMAN L. J. 1095, 1101 (2004),
available at <http://www.germanlawjournal.com>.
81. See Michaels & Zimmer, supra note 52, at 457.
82. Empagran, 124 S. Ct. at 2368.
83. Id.
84. However, it must be noted that the Supreme Court confined its holding in
Empagran to cases where the anticompetitive conduct resulted in independent foreign harm.
Thus, it is clearly distinguishable from the situation in Hartford Fire where the
anticompetitive effect was felt in the U.S. alone. It is therefore arguable that Empagran
does not suggest that comity must be considered in the more common cases involving
foreign conduct which causes domestic effects and domestic injuries. See Buxbaum, supra
note 80, at 1103.
85. Oral Argument at *30, F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran, 124 S.Ct. 2359,
2004 WL 1047902.
86. Empagran Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors Michaels, Buxbaum & Muir Watt,
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case-by-case solution, taking into consideration different factors, most
notably whether the foreign country in which the plaintiff had suffered his
injuries efficiently regulates cartels and whether the exercise of U.S.
jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claim would cause a conflict with that
country's regulatory efforts. In turn, the Supreme Court stated
straightforwardly that the consideration of comity considerations on a case-
by-case basis is "too complex to prove workable." 87  Convinced that
antitrust issues are complex by nature, the Court did not want to confer
upon U.S. courts the burden of comparing solutions of foreign antitrust law
with U.S. regulation, which would only lead to "lengthier proceedings,
appeals and more proceedings - to the point where procedural costs and
delays could themselves threaten interference with a foreign nation's ability
to maintain the integrity of its own antitrust enforcement system."
88
Observing that even in a simple price-fixing case such as Empagran,
competing briefs reached different conclusions on whether the potential
treble damages liability would strengthen (through increased deterrence)
89
or weaken (by impairing amnesty programs)9" the enforcement of the
widespread ban on price fixing, Justice Breyer did not see how a court
could simply and expeditiously assess the impact of U.S. jurisdiction on
foreign interests. 91
This finding merits approval. Assessing whether the foreign law
effectively regulates cartel conduct would confer upon U.S. courts the task
of determining whether a foreign sovereign has adequate antitrust laws and
whether it enforces its laws efficiently.
It is hard to see how a court could fulfill such a mission, especially
with regard to jurisdictions in transition states.92 Typically those countries
have recently enacted antitrust statutes and designed enforcement
authorities. Panama and Ukraine, where some of the plaintiffs in
Empagran sustained their injuries, may serve as an illustrative example.
supra note 57, at * 19-23.
87. Empagran, 124 S. Ct. at 2368.
88. Id. at 2369.
89. Empgran Brief of Amici Curiae of Professors Darren Bush, John M. Connor, John
J. Flynn, et al., 2004 WL 533933, at *2-3 (2004).
90. See Empagran briefs, supra note 49.
91. Empagran, 124 S. Ct. at 2369.
92. Today, over ninety states have adopted antitrust laws. See Diane P. Wood,
International Harmonization of Antitrust Law: The Tortoise or the Hare?, 3 CHICAGO J.
INT'L L. 391, 392 n.6 (2002). This development was fostered in the eighties and nineties by
the collapse of the socialist countries in Eastern Europe and the pressure of donors and
international institutions on developing countries to introduce market-friendly competition
policies.
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Panama enacted its Competition Act in 1996. 93 It reads like a robust
competition law: it not only prohibits horizontal price fixing conspiracies,
94
it also provides for a damage remedy entitling injured parties to seek treble
damages,95 and allows enforcement authorities to impose harsh fines.96
Panama's Competition Authority (Commission de la Libre Competencia y
Asuntos de Consumidor) lists some activities on its website, including
some reports on cases in which it sanctioned anticompetitive conduct.
97
A similar picture is presented in the law of Ukraine, which enacted its
Limitation of Monopolism and Prevention of Unfair Competition Act in
1992.98 This act has been frequently amended and, in 2001, became the
Law of Ukraine on Protection of Economic Competition.99 It prohibits
horizontal price-fixing agreements'00 and provides for a damages
93. See Ley no. 29, de 1 febrero de 1996 (Pan.), available at
<http://www.globalcompetititonforum.org/regions/namerica/Panama/PANAMA.pdf>.
94. Cf id. at art. 11(1) (stating:
Pr-cticas Monopolisticas Absolutas. Son prdcticas monopolisticas absolutas,
cualesquiera combinaciones, arreglos, convenios o contratos, entre agentes
econ6micos competidores o potencialmente competidores, entre si, cuyos objetos o
efectos sean cualquiera de los siguientes: 1. Fijar, manipular, concertar o imponer
el precio de venta o compra de bienes o servicios, o intercambiar informaci6n con
el mismo objeto o efecto; ...
95. Cf id. at art. 27 (stating:
Condenas. En todos los casos en que se infrinjan las prohibiciones contenidas en
este titulo, los tribunales de justicia creados por esta Ley, mediante acci6n civil
interpuesta por el agraviado, podrdn imponer a favor de dste o los afectados,
condena al agente econ6mico, equivalente a tres (3) veces el monto de los daflos y
perjuicios causados como resultado del acto ilicito, ademds de las costas que se
hayan causado. No obstante, el tribunal que conozca de la causa correspondiente
podrd limitar el monto de la condena al importe de los dafios y perjuicios causados,
o reducirlo a dos veces el importe de tales dafios o perjuicios, en ambos casos con
la condena en costas, cuando compruebe que el agente econ6mico condenado ha
actuado sin mala fe o sin intenci6n de causar dafio).
96. Cf id. at art. 27 (stating:
Sanciones. Los actos que constituyan pr~cticas monopolisticas absolutas no
tendr n validez juridica, y los agentes econ6micos que los realicen serdn
sancionados conforme a esta Ley, sin perjuicio de la responsabilidad penal que les
corresponda. Estos actos serdn sancionados, aun cuando no se hayan
perfeccionado o no hayan surtido sus efectos).
97. See <http://www.clicad.gob.pa>.
98. Law of Ukraine on Limitation of Monopolism and Prevention of Unfair
Competition in Entrepreneurial Activities, (No. 2132-XII, adopted February 18, 1992). For
a survey on the Act's main provisions see Gavin Murphy, An Overview of Ukrainian
Competition Law, 21 ECLR 415-17 (2000).
99. An unofficial English translation of the current version is available at
<http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/europe.htm#Ukraine>.
100. Cf supra note 99, at art. 6(2)(1) (stating: Concerted actions shall be considered as
anticompetitive ones if they, in particular, concem: the setting of prices or other conditions
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remedy.'0 Furthermore, Ukraine has also established a Competition
Authority which may impose fines on companies or individuals. 0 2 The
Ukrainian Competition Authority has, at least in one case, fined a company
for anticompetitive conduct in a monopolization case.10 Commentators
note that, though competition policy in Ukraine is in its infancy, the
"competition laws are firmly in place with 27 regional offices and a total
staff of 700.
"'04
It is difficult to see how a judge shall proceed when confronted with
such a situation. The problems of assessing the "adequacy" and
"efficiency" of foreign regulatory policy and practice respectively are
manifold. First, setting a threshold for "adequacy" of foreign legal norms
is already a thorny problem. It is hard to see how U.S. courts can rate
foreign antitrust enforcement schemes which are, as pointed out above,' °5
often very distinct from U.S. law. Second, with regard to the "efficiency"
of foreign enforcement practices the question arises whether U.S. courts
should consider only the foreign "law in the books", or whether they have
to investigate the "law in action" and determine whether there is a steady
practice by foreign courts or competition authorities respectively to enforce
their antitrust rules.
These troubles have led U.S. courts in forum non conveniens cases to
refrain from engaging in a detailed analysis comparing U.S. and foreign
law'0 6 for good reasons: any rating of foreign legal systems inevitably leads
to diplomatic friction. Even though developing countries have not yet
raised objections against the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust
with respect to the purchase or sale of products;... ).
101. Cf. id at art. 55 (1) (stating: Persons who suffer damage resulting from a violation
of the laws on the protection of economic competition may apply to a court of justice, a
court of arbitration for the reimbursement for damages).
102. Cf. id. at art. 52 (1) (stating:
Bodies of the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine shall impose fines on
associations, economic entities; legal persons; natural persons; such a group of
economic entities being legal and (or) natural persons that in accordance with
Article 1 of the present Law is considered as an economic entity in the cases
provided for by Part 4 of the present Article).
103. See Murphy, supra note 98, at 418 Annex A (DAE-case).
104. Id.
105. See infra pp. 108-110.
106. See Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 251 (stating: "The doctrine of forum non
conveniens, however, is designed in part to help courts avoid conducting complex exercises
in comparative law"); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 67 S. Ct. 839, 842 (1947) (stating: "There is
an appropriateness, too, in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with
the state law that must govern the case, rather than having a court in some other forum
untangle problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign to itself.").
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law, it is likely that a state having enacted antirust laws would protest
against U.S. court decisions openly labeling enforcement mechanisms of
that state as "non-efficient." To avoid such clashes, U.S. courts have
generally been very cautious to pronounce judgment on the "quality" of
foreign sovereigns' policy choices. For example, in the Bhopal case'
0 7
concerning tort claims of victims from a disastrous gas leak at a chemical
plant in Bhopal, India, Judge Keenan was very hesitant to evaluate whether
Indian courts were able to manage such a complex mass tort case. He
dismissed the action brought by Indian plaintiffs against the American
tortfeasor, despite the fact that a litigation before Indian courts would be
more burdensome, emphasizing that to retain litigation in this forum
"would be yet another example of imperialism, another situation in which
an established sovereign inflicted its rules on a developing nation."',0 8 The
underlying rationale of this prudent jurisprudence must also apply when
assessing the international reach of U.S. antitrust law. Therefore, judges
should not take into account the state of antitrust enforcement in foreign
jurisdictions.
C. Loophole: Global Markets
Closing U.S. courthouse doors to plaintiffs who have sustained
antitrust injury in wholly foreign transactions means that cartel members
may keep profits generated in markets with severe enforcement gaps.
Those profits are not negligible'0 9 and might be used to offset damages to
be paid under U.S. law.110 Furthermore, confining jurisdiction to injuries
sustained in domestic markets means that no court has jurisdiction to
adjudicate the entire damage. The prospect of litigating in various courts
all over the globe will keep injured parties from initiating recovery
proceedings. 11
Against this background, the Supreme Court seemed to be aware that
there might be cases where foreign plaintiffs should be allowed to bring
107. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in December, 1984,
634 F.Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
108. Id. at 867.
109. See Margaret Levenstein et al., International Price-Fixing Cartels and Developing
Countries: A Discussion of Effects and Policy Remedies, POLITICAL ECONOMY RESEARCH
INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER SERIES (2003). (According to this study, in 1997 developing
countries imported $54.7 billion of goods from nineteen industries with an international
price-fixing conspiracy in the 1990s. These imports represented 5.2% of total imports and
1.2% of GDP in developing countries).
110. Empagran Brief for Certain Professors of Economics as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents, 2004 WL 533930, at * 10-11.
111. Michaels & Zimmer, supra note 52, at 455.
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their claims. In the vitamins litigation, it was argued that vitamins were
fungible and readily transportable. If the U.S. market had been excluded
from the global price-fixing conspiracy, the cartel would have collapsed
due to the very likely possibility of arbitrage, proving that the foreign
effects were inextricably intertwined with the domestic harm felt in the
United States.' 12 The Supreme Court left it open whether foreign plaintiffs
have a Sherman Act claim if the foreign injury is intertwined with domestic
harm 13 by confining its ruling to the fact that the foreign harm was
independent of the cartel's effects on the U.S. market."14
Intertwined effects are not uncommon in international cartel cases. In
Kruman v. Christie's International PLC,"15 the price-fixing conspiracy
concerned auction houses controlling 97% of the market for fine arts,
antiques, and collectibles. One can argue that such a market is truly global
because sellers and buyers are the same worldwide at auctions for such
select items. 116 The same can be assumed in Den Norske Stats Ojeselskap
AS v. HeereMac VOF.1 17 In this case, the conspiracy concerned services
for heavy lift barges; only seven existed and they were deployed
worldwide. 118
Hence, foreign plaintiffs unable to seek redress in their countries still
have a chance to recover for antitrust injuries under U.S. law if they can
prove that their injuries are intertwined with domestic harm. There are
some arguments for allowing foreign plaintiffs to sue before U.S. courts. It
seems that in truly global markets, the number of market participants is
relatively small. Unlike a vitamins cartel, where literally thousands of
consumers bought vitamin products worldwide, the art auctioning and the
lift barge cases concerned only a small group of injured foreign customers.
As a consequence, there are not so many potential foreign plaintiffs that it
112. Empagran Brief for Respondents, 2004 WL 533935, at *9.
113. Michaels & Zimmer, supra note 52, at 454; Buxbaum, supra note 80, at 1103.
114. Empagran, 124 S.Ct. at 2372. The case was remanded for further proceedings to the
D.C. Circuit Court. This court has ordered the parties to submit briefs addressing, inter alia,
the issues (i) whether the domestic effects of the appellees' anticompetitive conduct were in
fact linked to the foreign injury the appellants claim to have suffered, and (ii) whether the
nature of that link is legally sufficient to trigger application of the FTAIA's domestic-injury
exception. See Empagran court order, available at 2004 WL 1398217.
115. Kruman v. Christie's International PLC, 284 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2002).
116. Michaels & Zimmer, supra note 52, at 455; Daniel Zimmer, Kruman, Empagran
und die Folgen: Internationale Wettbewerbspolitik in Zeiten Exorbitanter Durchsetzung
Nationalen Kartellrechts, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR ULRICH IMMENGA 475, 491 (Andreas Fuchs et
al., eds., 2004).
117. 241 F.3d420(5thCir. 2001).
118. Id.
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would absorb U.S. judicial resources.
IV. Adjustment of Fines in Governmental Actions
Finally, it is arguable that fines imposed on cartel members in
governmental actions should reflect that international cartels generate
profits in many Third World countries without effective antitrust law
enforcement. In other words, those fines should be higher if the cartel had
substantial activities in countries where the cartelists do not have to fear
any punishment for their anticompetitive conduct. A passage in Empagran
might suggest that the Supreme Court is not generally opposed to such an
idea. Justice Breyer observed that "a government plaintiff has broader
powers" 119 than a private plaintiff "to protect the public from further
anticompetitive conduct and to redress anticompetitive harm."' 120  But it
would go too far to conclude from this general finding that the United
States may impose fines to punish anticompetitive effects in foreign
markets. Enforcing U.S. antitrust law in cases where the relevant adverse
effect occurred abroad might conflict with the principle of state
sovereignty. According to this long-standing principle of public
international law, each individual state has the power to enact and enforce
laws within its own territory. 121  Although public international law is
evolving and exceptions to this traditional rule of law are gaining
ground, 122 thus further reducing the territorial links deemed necessary to
establish jurisdiction over anticompetitive conduct, a state cannot impose
fines for anticompetitive effects on foreign markets.123 Thus, under the law
as it stands, fines in governmental actions cannot reflect injuries occurring
in foreign territories. Things would be different if a bilateral "positive
comity" agreement empowered U.S. authorities upon the request of foreign
states to fine antitrust law violations that have an effect on a given foreign
119. Empagran, 124 S.Ct. at 2370.
120. Id.
121. On this principle of public international law, see IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 287-297 (6th ed. 2003); R. Y. Jennings, Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction and the United States Antitrust Laws, BRIT. YB INT. L. 1957, 146-75; see also
Frederick A. Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law, Acad6mie de Droit
International, Rec. des Cours 1964-1, 1-154.
122. See MAHER M. DABBAH, THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF ANTITRUST POLICY 160-61
(2003).
123. See, e.g., Case T-224/00, Archer Daniels Midland Company v. Commission of
European Communities, 2003 E.C.R. 11-2597, 2647 (arguing that a U.S. judgment imposing
fines which related to the application of the cartel or its effects other than in the U.S., e.g.,
for effects felt in the European Economic Area, "would clearly have encroached on the
territorial jurisdiction" of the European Commission).
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market. 124 However, if the gains in foreign countries also have adverse
effects on the domestic market, those effects can be reflected in the amount
of the fines.
V. Conclusion
The recent Supreme Court decision in Empagran made abundantly
clear that the United States is not the antitrust police force of the world. A
statement applauded by many foreign nations. But the Court declined to
address whether foreign plaintiffs may invoke the Sherman Act when a
market is truly global. Courts will now have to develop a workable
definition of "intertwined effects" for today's interdependent world
economy, in which everything affects everything else.1
25
The latest controversy surrounding the extraterritorial reach of U.S.
antitrust law has further proven that national law solutions are not sufficient
to tackle conspiracies operating in globalized markets. National tools are
not a fitting remedy for the shortcomings of other jurisdictions. This
finding calls for renewed international efforts to control abusive private
business practices and to foster efficient international antitrust enforcement.
124. E.g., Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the
European Communities on the Application of Positive Comity Principles in the Enforcement
of Their Competition Laws, art. III, available at
<http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/intemational/docs/1781 .htm> (stating:
The competition authorities of a Requesting Party may request the competition
authorities of a Requested Party to investigate and, if warranted, to remedy
anticompetitive activities in accordance with the Requested Party's competition
laws. Such a request may be made regardless of whether the activities also violate
the Requesting Party's competition laws, and regardless of whether the
competition authorities of the Requesting Party have commenced or contemplate
taking enforcement activities under their own competition laws).
125. AREEDA & HovENKAMP, supra note 14, at 270(b), 336.
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